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In conclusion
The Tax Court decision in Lawinger,21 is not surprising.
The statute is remedial legislation and should be construed
in a manner to enable qualified farm debtors to restructure
their debt and to avoid recognition of income to the extent
tax attributes and property basis can be reduced. Thus, the
decision on gains from farm machinery and equipment
represents a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Presumably, gains from the sales of land would be treated in
the same manner.
A question remains as to income from a crop or
livestock share lease of farmland. While a holding that cash
rents are not income from the trade or business of farming is
compatible with a long list of court decisions,22 land under
crop share and livestock share leases has been held to be an
interest in a closely held business for other purposes.23
Presumably, material participation share leases would be
deemed to produce income eligible for the 50 percent test
under the solvent farm debtor rule but the outcome of
income under a non-material participation lease is less clear.
Arguably, income from such leases should count for
purposes of the 50 percent test but that outcome will await
further court decisions.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was convicted, under N.D.
Cent. Code § 12.1-23-02, of stealing four horses from a
creditor. The creditor brought a civil court action to recover
damages from the theft and the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
The debtor sought to have the civil action damages declared
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because the
thefts were not made with malice toward the creditor since
the debtor did not intend to harm the creditor or the
creditor’s property. The court held that Section 12.1-23-02
required proof of the debtor’s intent to deprive another of
property; therefore, the first element, intent, of Section
523(a)(6) was met. The court held that the theft of the
horses was malicious because the debtor knew or should
have known that the theft of the horses would cause harm to
the creditor; therefore, the damages awarded in the civil
action were nondischargeable. In re Roehrich, 169 B.R.
941 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors sought to avoid a
nonpurchase-money security interest in a handgun claimed
as an exempt household good. The court held that the pistol
was a household good and the lien was avoidable as
impairing the exemption. The court adopted the definition of
“household good” established in In re McGreeny, 955 F.2d
957 (4th Cir. 1992) as goods typically found around the
home and used to facilitate the day-to-day living within the
home. Thus, because a pistol is used in the home for
protection, a pistol was a household good. Matter of
Raines, 170 B.R. 187 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff’g, 161 B.R. 548
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
GROWING CROPS. On the date of the petition, the
debtors owned growing crops worth about $14,000. The
value of the crops did not exceed the amount of liens against
the crops but the debtors claimed an exemption for “41
percent of growing crops” with a listed value of $5,950. The
crops were sold post-petition for over $56,400, more than
enough to pay the lien, any expenses and the exemption.
The debtors claimed 41 percent of that amount as exempt.
The court held that the debtors would be allowed an
exemption based on the sale value of the crops but that the
debtors’ exemption was limited to the dollar amount
claimed of $5,950 because the debtor could not benefit from
the post-petition appreciation of the crop. Matter of
Sherbahn, 170 B.R. 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1994).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor’s estate included 140 acres
of farmland, 60 acres of which was separated from the other
acres by a graded road. The debtor claimed the entire 140
acres as an exempt homestead under Fla. Const. Art. X, § 4
which allowed a homestead exemption for up to 160 acres
of contiguous farmland. The trustee objected to the
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inclusion of the 60 acres in the exempt homestead because
the land was not contiguous to the 80 acres containing the
debtor’s residence. The road was originally a three-path
carriage road which had been graded by the county. The title
to the land had not been transferred to the county or state
and the court ruled that the county had not obtained title by
adverse possession or by dedication because the road was
not originally constructed by the county. Therefore, the
public easement created by the historical public use of the
road was not sufficient to break the contiguous nature of the
entire 140 acres. The debtor also owned a federal peanut
allotment for the farm and sought to include the allotment as
an improvement of the homestead. The court held that the
allotment was not part of the real property because the
allotment could be transferred separate from the property. In
re Jackson, 169 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994).
IRA. The debtors, aged 37 and 35, were both healthy
and had jobs. The debtors claimed an IRA as exempt under
11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The court held that the debtors were not
entitled to claim the IRA as exempt because the IRA funds
were not reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtors. The court that the debtors were young enough, had
no dependents and had other pension funds to adequately
prepare for retirement without the funds in the IRA. In re
Lima, 169 B.R. 486 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
The debtors claimed as exempt an IRA which included
amounts rolled over from an I.R.C. § 401 pension plan
established by the debtors’ company. The IRS had issued
determination letters qualifying the plan. The IRS assessed
penalties against the debtors for improper loans from the
Section 401 plan. A creditor objected to the IRA exemption,
arguing that the rolled over funds were not qualified because
of the loans. The Bankruptcy Court denied the exemption
and the District Court affirmed. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the courts were required to defer to
the IRS’s determination as to the qualification of the Section
401 plan. Matter of Youngblood, 29 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.
1994).
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtor owned 102 acres
of farmland and several pieces of farm machinery. The land
and machinery were leased to a farm corporation of which
the debtor owed 14 percent and was the president. As
president of the corporation, the debtor actively participated
in the management of the farm business. The debtor’s
children owned the remaining 86 percent of the corporation.
The debtor claimed $10,000 of the machinery as exempt
tools of the trade under Va. Code §§ 34-26(7), 34-27 and
sought to avoid a lien on the machinery. Prior to leasing the
land and machinery to the corporation the debtor and
deceased spouse had farmed the land for over 35 years. The
court held that the debtor was engaged in the business of
agriculture sufficient to claim the farm machinery as exempt
tools of the trade. In re Ottoway, 169 B.R. 581 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1994).
    CHAPTER 11   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtors had granted a pre-petition security
interest in their livestock to secure a loan from a creditor.
The debtor’s Chapter 11 plan provided for full payment of
the loan over the life of the plan but did not provide for the
creditor to retain its lien on the livestock. The creditor did
not object to the plan. The debtors were current on all plan
payments when they sold all of the collateral livestock
during the plan period. The creditor brought an action in
state court for conversion resulting from the sale of the
collateral in violation of the security agreement. The debtors
argued that the confirmation of the plan extinguished the
creditor’s lien. The court held that the plan was clear and the
creditor had adequate notice of the plan’s extinguishing of
the lien. The court noted that the debtors were still obligated
to repay the loan but were not prevented from selling the
livestock because the lien no longer existed. Matter of
Penrod, 169 B.R. 910 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
P L A N . The debtor’s confirmed Chapter 12 plan
provided that there was $29,000 to be paid to priority
creditors and general unsecured creditors. The debtors had
made a pre-confirmation $9,000 payment to the IRS on a
priority claim, another $3,800 to the IRS after confirmation,
$500 to the county for weed removal, and $14,900 to the
county for property taxes. The remaining amount, $800, was
available for the unsecured creditors. None of the paid
creditors had filed a claim in the case, although the debtor
had listed the claims on the schedules. One unsecured
creditor had filed a claim which was allowed and argued
that the debtors had failed to pay on unsecured claims the
amount which the claims would have received in a Chapter
7 liquidation. The court held that the $500 paid for the weed
removal claim and $8,400 of the property taxes claim were
not priority claims and should have received pro rata
payments with the other unsecured claims. The debtor was
required to pay to the trustee $8,900 for pro rata distribution
on the other unsecured allowed claims. The court did not
discuss why the debtors were required to pay the entire
$8,900 when the weed control and property tax claims were
at least entitled to a pro rata share of the unsecured claims’
payments, except that there was some question as to
whether these claims were allowable because no claims
were filed by the creditors. In re Becker, 169 B.R. 725
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
MODIFICATION OF PLAN. The debtors’ chapter 13
plan provided for complete payment of a loan secured by
the debtors’ house. The debtors defaulted on the plan
payments and the creditor repossessed the house and sold it.
The debtors sought to include the deficiency in the
unsecured claims covered by the plan. The creditor
objected, arguing that because the plan provided for 100
percent payment of secured claims, the debtors were
required to pay the entire deficiency as a secured claim and
that any change in the claim’s status violated the rules for
modification of the plan. The court noted that the
repossession occurred without first obtaining relief from the
automatic stay and ruled that the effect of the repossession
was to be determined as if relief from the automatic stay had
been granted. The court held that once relief from the stay is
granted as to secured property, the rights of the parties are to
be determined under state law governing foreclosures.
Under state law, any deficiency remaining after a
foreclosure sale is an unsecured claim against the debtors;
therefore, the deficiency claim was to be included with the
other unsecured claims. The court noted that the creditor’s
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right to receive complete payment under the bankruptcy law
was extinguished once the creditor sought repossession
outside of bankruptcy. Similarly, the debtors’ obligation to
make complete payments was extinguished once the debtors
lost the right to retain possession of the collateral. In re
White, 169 B.R. 526 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor was a tax protester
who had not filed income tax returns for 1976 through 1983.
The IRS had filed claims for those tax years based on
substituted returns and sought relief from the automatic stay
to levy against the debtor’s wages. The court denied the
relief from the automatic stay because the IRS failed to
provide evidence that it had followed the procedures for
assessment and notice to the debtor. The court noted that the
debtor, age 76, had few wages beyond those essential for the
debtor’s support, the tax claims were nondischargeable
because the debtor did not file returns, and the delay of
about a month until the case was closed did not harm the
IRS. In re Weatherley, 169 B.R. 555 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994).
The debtor was the ex-spouse of a taxpayer who
underreported several years of joint federal taxes without
the knowledge of the debtor. The debtor filed for
bankruptcy because of the debtor’s potential liability for the
taxes; however, the IRS issued a post-petition notice of levy
against the debtor’s bank account, causing several of the
debtor’s previously issued checks to bounce and the debtor
to be assessed for returned checks. The IRS argued that the
oversight was not willful in that its collection records were
held by an office different from the bankruptcy claims office
and that the ex-spouse’s address was different from the
debtor’s. The court noted that the IRS information system
had the ability to record several other pieces of information
about the debtor but failed to record the bankruptcy filing.
The court held that the IRS’s notice of levy was a willful
violation of the automatic stay, the IRS had waived its
immunity by filing a claim in the case, and the debtor was
entitled to actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.
Matter of Flynn, 169 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
CLAIMS. The IRS had filed a claim for federal income
taxes owed by the Chapter 13 debtors for 1990 and 1991.
The IRS filed amended claims for the same tax years which
were allowed under agreements with the debtors. However,
in July 1993, after the bar date for filing claims, the IRS
filed another amended claim which added $36,000 in
penalties under I.R.C. § 6672 based on the debtors’
connection with a company which failed to pay withholding
taxes in 1991. The IRS argued that the Section 6672 claim
was sufficiently related to the other claim to be allowed as
an amendment of that claim and that because the IRS had
not finished its investigation of the company until March
1993, the IRS should be allowed to file the claim. The court
held that the Section 6672 penalty claim was not related to
the income tax claims previously filed, the IRS had
sufficient notice and opportunity to obtain extensions for the
penalty claim, and the untimely filing of the new claim
barred allowance of the claim. In re Friesenhahn, 169 B.R.
615 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
The debtors were related corporations. The IRS had filed
a timely claim for FICA withholding taxes owed by one
corporation for the fourth quarter of 1991. The IRS then
discovered a deficiency in the FICA withholding taxes due
for the fourth quarter of 1990 by both corporations but the
claims for those taxes were not filed until after the claims
bar date. The IRS argued that the late filed claims should be
allowed because the IRS had relied on false FICA returns
filed by the debtors and filed the claims as soon as the
investigation made possible. The court also noted that the
IRS had notified the debtors that discrepancies had been
found, thus alerting the debtors to the possibility that
additional claims could be filed. The court held that the late
claims would be allowed. In re Sage-Dey, Inc., 170 B.R.
46 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1994).
The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 13 case which
was dismissed. The debtor’s current Chapter 13 case was
filed more than 3 years after income tax returns were filed
and more than 240 days after the taxes were assessed. The
Chapter 13 plan provided for 100 percent payment of the tax
claims as a priority claim. A creditor objected to treatment
of the taxes as a priority claim because the claim did not
qualify under Section 507(a)(7)(A). The IRS argued that the
previous Chapter 13 case tolled the limitation periods of
Section 507(a)(7)(A). The court held that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)
did not apply to bankruptcy statutory limitation periods;
therefore, the previous Chapter 13 case did not statutorily
toll the Section 507(a)(7)(A) limitation periods. However,
the court held that it had the equitable power to allow the
priority of such claims. The court held that, as to the
creditor, the equities favored not allowing the claim to have
priority and to be treated as a general unsecured claim. The
court also held; however, that, as to the debtor, the claim
may still be entitled to priority status and required to be
completely paid. The court left the last issue for further
hearings. In re Eysenbach, 170 B.R. 57 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 1994).
The IRS filed its claim for taxes after the claims bar date
even though it had received notice of the bankruptcy filing.
The IRS provided no excuse for the untimely filing other
than administrative delay; therefore, the court held that the
untimely claim would not be allowed. In re Worthington
Investments, Inc., 170 B.R. 123 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
The IRS filed claims for taxes owed by the debtor for
which the tax returns were filed more than three years
before the petition and were assessed less than 240 days
before the petition but more than three years after the
returns were filed. The debtor had previously filed a Chapter
7 case and a tax matters partner had signed a consent to
extend the assessment period for partnership tax items
which was the basis for one of the claims against the debtor.
The court held that the intervening Chapter 7 case tolled the
limitations period in Section 507(a)(7)(A) for priority status
of the claim and that the extension filed by the tax matters
partner was valid to the debtor. In re Acosta, 170 B.R. 124
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).
CONTRACTS
OPTIONS. A bankruptcy debtor had entered into an
agreement with a joint venture which gave the joint venture
the option to purchase a ranch operated by the joint venture
and owned by the debtor. The debtor had terminated the
agreement and the ranch became part of the bankruptcy
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estate. The joint venture did not exercise the option but
argued that its option right was still viable after the
bankruptcy filing because the option agreement allowed
payments up to a date after the bankruptcy filing. The court
held that the agreement had explicit language that the option
had to be exercised by a date certain and held that the date
could not be extended by implications from the later
payment dates. The court also held that the debtor had
properly terminated the joint venture agreement which also
caused termination of the option agreement. In re Whatley,
169 B.R. 698 (D. Colo. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations adding provisions for cotton
crop insurance to the Common Crop Insurance Policy. 59
Fed. Reg. 49151 (Sept. 27, 1994).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations adding
provisions for coarse grains (corn, grain sorghum) and
soybeans crop insurance to the Common Crop Insurance
Policy. The provisions allow for coverage for late and
prevented planting. 59 Fed. Reg. 49157 (Sept. 27, 1994).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations adding
provisions for extra long staple cotton crop insurance to the
Common Crop Insurance Policy. 59 Fed. Reg. 49166 (Sept.
27, 1994).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations establishing
the Actual Production History program which bases
insurance coverage on the insured’s actual production
history which will be multiplied by a percentage of an
elected coverage level and price per commodity unit to
determine the dollar amount of insurance coverage per acre.
59 Fed. Reg. 47783 (Sept. 19, 1994).
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS-ALM § 10.03[3][b].* The
plaintiff was a general partnership which operated a farm
leased from another entity. Prior to 1986 the partnership was
comprised of four individuals and a limited partnership
consisting of six individuals. In 1986, for federal tax
reasons, the limited partnership was dissolved and the
partners became general partners of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff obtained advice from the county ASCS office that
the change would result in the six new partners being
considered as separate persons for payment limitation
purposes if each made a capital contribution to the plaintiff.
The capital contributions were made and the county and
state ASCS offices determined that the additional partners
were each a separate person for payment limitation
purposes. DASCO reversed the decision, holding that, under
7 C.F.R. § 795.14, no substantial change in the farming
operation occurred. The court held that because of testimony
of one of the partners that the farming operation remained
the same after the change, the DASCO determination was
reasonable and not arbitrary under the regulations. The court
also held that the plaintiff did not rely on the county ASCS
office advice because the limited partnership was dissolved
for other reasons. VAL Farms v. Espy, 29 F.3d 1470 (10th
Cir. 1994).
WOOL . The CCC has adopted as final regulations
determining the support price of $4.739 per pound for 1995
wool on unshorn lambs and for mohair. 59 Fed. Reg. 48787
(Sept. 23, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s will
bequeathed all of the stock of a corporation to the surviving
spouse. The will also provided that if the spouse disclaimed
any portion of the bequest, the disclaimed property passed
to the decedent’s children. Within nine months after the
decedent’s death, the surviving spouse disclaimed a portion
of the stock with an estate tax value sufficient to decrease
the estate’s federal estate and state inheritance taxes to a
certain amount. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was
effective. Ltr. Rul. 9437029, June 17, 1994.
The taxpayers were current or contingent beneficiaries
of pre-1977 trusts established by their grandparents. The
taxpayers learned of the existence of their interests in the
trust when the taxpayers were 19 and 20 and proposed to
disclaim any interests in the trusts’ principals. Under Rhode
Island law, a disclaimer had to be filed within nine months
after a beneficiary reached age 18. The taxpayers had
petitioned a state court for an extension of time to file the
disclaimers. The IRS ruled that because the trusts were
established before 1977, the disclaimers would be effective
and would not be subject to gift tax if the taxpayers obtained
the state court extension. Ltr. Rul. 9436041, June 13, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s executor failed to include a
doctor’s certification that the decedent was mentally
incompetent from October 22, 1986 until death, such that a
trust funded by the decedent’s will would not be subject to
GSTT. The IRS ruled that a certification filed with a return
was not absolute proof of the decedent’s mental competency
and that the failure to include the certification did not
preclude a finding that the decedent was incompetent;
therefore, the failure to include the certification did not
preclude exclusion of the trust from GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9437037, June 21, 1994.
GROSS ESTATE. Several months before death, the
decedent received money in settlement of a personal injury
action. The decedent’s mother was named as trustor of a
trust established to receive the settlement proceeds. The
decedent was the income beneficiary of the trust and had a
special power to appoint the trust corpus to anyone except
the decedent or the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s will
exercised the power of appointment. The IRS ruled that the
personal injury action settlement proceeds belonged to the
decedent prior to transfer to the trust and was an incomplete
gift because the decedent retained the special power of
appointment; therefore, the trust corpus was included in the
decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9437034, June 20, 1994.
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The
taxpayer owned shares of stock in a corporation. The
taxpayer placed an order with a stockbroker for a short sale
of the corporation’s stock with the broker borrowing
sufficient shares of the stock to cover the short sale even
though the taxpayer already owned sufficient shares to
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cover the sale. The IRS ruled that if the taxpayer died before
the short sale was closed, the basis of the owned stock and
borrowed stock would be determined under I.R.C. § 1014
and any income resulting from the closing of the sale after
the taxpayer’s death would not be income in respect of
decedent because more than a ministerial act would need to
be performed in order to complete the transaction. Ltr. Rul.
9436017, June 17, 1994.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The donor
transferred assets to an irrevocable trust with the donee as
sole beneficiary with the power to invade trust principal for
the donee’s medical care, education or support. If the donee
predeceases the donor, the trust corpus passed to the donor
in trust. On the death of the survivor of the donee or donor,
the trust corpus passed to the donor’s children. The IRS
ruled that the trust was eligible for the gift tax QTIP and if
no gift tax QTIP election was made, the trust would be
eligible for the estate tax QTIP and a reverse QTIP election
for GSTT purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9437032, June 20, 1994.
The decedent’s estate included liability for secured
debts. The surviving spouse elected to take the statutory
elective share of one-third of the estate. The Tennessee state
probate court entered an order that one-third of the estate,
before reduction of the secured debts, was to pass to the
spouse. The estate selected unencumbered assets and
distributed them to the spouse and claimed a marital
deduction equal to the value of the assets. The Tax Court
ruled that Tennessee law subjected all of the estate’s assets,
including those passing to the surviving spouse as an
elective share, to the secured debts; therefore, the marital
deduction was to be reduced by one-third of the secured
debts. Estate of Williams v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 25
(1994).
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. A charitable remainder
trust was established by the decedent’s will and had one of
the beneficiaries named as trustee. An independent trust
company was named as the sole successor trustee but the
company no longer handled trusts. The trustee petitioned the
state court to name the purchaser of the company as the new
successor trustee. Under California law, a trustee bank may
be replaced as trustee if the bank is purchased by another
bank. The IRS ruled that, because replacement of the trustee
was made under state law, the current trustee did not have,
nor did the trustee exercise or release a power of
appointment through the naming of the successor trustee.
Ltr. Rul. 94370019, June 16, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[3].* The taxpayer had obtained term
life insurance through group term life insurance provided by
the taxpayer’s employer. The taxpayer assigned all rights in
the policy to an insurance trust with the assignment naming
the specific insurance company which issued the policy. The
insurance company was merged into another company and
the taxpayer decided to confirm the assignment and amend
the assignment to cover any insurance company which
issued the policy. The IRS ruled that because the merger
was beyond the control of the taxpayer, the confirmation of
and amendment of the assignment would not cause the
insurance policy proceeds to be included in the taxpayer’s
gross estate if the taxpayer died within three years after the
confirmation. Ltr. Rul. 9436036, June 10, 1994.
VALUATION. The donor transferred 30 percent of a
corporation’s stock to each of three children, with the donor
and donor’s spouse holding 5 percent of the stock each after
the gift. The donor valued the stock using the net asset value
of the corporation and discounting the stock for “minority
interest and marketability.” The IRS ruled that because each
30 percent shareholder had the power to join with one other
30 percent shareholder to control the corporation, the value
of the shares must be increased to reflect the “swing vote”
power of the stock. The IRS noted that this result would
apply even if the 30 percent shares were transferred at
different times. The first transfer would not receive the
enhanced value of the swing vote but upon the transfer of
the second 30 percent, an indirect gift to the first 30 percent
shareholder would occur equal to the enhanced value from
the swing vote power conferred by reason of the second 30
percent transfer. Ltr. Rul. 9436005, May 26, 1994.
The taxpayer established a trust for the taxpayer’s
descendants and spouses, with the taxpayer barred from
being trustee or beneficiary of the trust. The trust was
funded with publicly trade stock. The taxpayer sold
additional stock and closely-held partnership interests to the
trust in exchange for 25 year notes with interest at the
current long term applicable federal rate under I.R.C. §
1274. The IRS ruled that the notes were not subject to
valuation under I.R.C. §§ 2701, 2702. Ltr. Rul. 9436006,
March 14, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX.  The taxpayer
corporation established an ESOP which borrowed funds to
purchase all of the corporation’s stock. The corporation
issued dividends to the ESOP which used the funds to make
payments on the loan. The corporation deducted the ESOP
dividends from gross income and did not include the
dividends in AMT income. The court held that, under Treas.
Reg. § 1.56(g)-1(d)(3)(iii)(E), the dividends were required
to be included in AMT income. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc.
v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,458 (C.D. Ill.
1994).
C CORPORATIONS
BUSINESS TRUSTS. A business trust established for
the taxpayer’s plumbing business was taxable as a
corporation because the trust would continue upon the
bankruptcy, death or insolvency of an owner, the taxpayer
and spouse were the only owners and both managed the
company and the taxpayer and spouse had the power to
distribute income at any time. Arcadia Plumbing Trust v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-455.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer, an airline pilot, brought a suit
against an airline under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act for wrongful termination of employment.
The parties reached a settlement which included back pay
and liquidated damages. Under 1977 law, the court held that
the back pay and liquidated damages were excludible from
the taxpayer’s income. Schmitz v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,455 (9th Cir. 1994).
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In 1986, the taxpayer received the proceeds of an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act action settlement against
an employer. The settlement did not segregate the payments
but the ADEA allowed back pay and liquidated damage
awards. The court held that the ADEA did not provide a
tort-like action for personal injuries; therefore, all of the
settlement payments were included in the taxpayer’s gross
income. Drase v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,463
(E.D. Ill. 1994).
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayers had excess investment interest from tax years
1983-1986 and carried the undeducted interest to 1987, in
which most of the excess interest was offset against
investment income in 1987. The remainder was carried over
to 1988 but the investment interest again exceeded income
and the total excess was carried over to 1989. The IRS
argued that the carryover amount was limited to taxable
income for each of the years involved. The court held that
the amount of excess investment interest carried over was
not limited to the taxpayer’s taxable income in each year.
Flood v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,454 (9th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, 845 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Alaska 1993).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON . The debtor was the
president of a corporation which failed to pay several
quarters of federal employment withholding taxes. The
plaintiff discovered that the taxes were not paid after an
investigation into the accounts handled by the plaintiff's
brother, the secretary-treasurer of the corporation. The
plaintiff consulted with an accountant and the IRS which
agreed not to pursue the I.R.C. § 6672 responsible person
penalty against the plaintiff and the plaintiff agreed to make
installment payments on the taxes owed. The IRS agreement
was sanctioned by a supervisor. The IRS continued to not
pursue the plaintiff and accepted installment payments until
the plaintiff and the corporation filed for bankruptcy. The
Bankruptcy Court held that the plaintiff was a responsible
person who had willfully failed to pay federal employment
withholding taxes but that the IRS was estopped from
assessing the penalty because of the plaintiff’s reliance on
the IRS’s agreement not to pursue the plaintiff as a
responsible person. The District Court reversed on the last
issue only, holding that the debtor’s reliance on the IRS
agent’s agreement was not reasonable because the agents
did not have the authority to make the agreement. In re
Mando, 170 B.R. 104 (E.D. Ky. 1994), aff’g in part and
rev’g in part, 154 B.R. 953 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. Under I.R.C. § 1363(d), a C
corporation which used the LIFO method in its last taxable
year before becoming an S corporation, must include in
income the LIFO recapture amount for that last taxable year
and make adjustments to the basis of inventory to take into
account the amount included in income. The LIFO recapture
amount equals the excess of FIFO inventory value over the
value under LIFO. The IRS has issued procedures for
reporting the LIFO recapture amount. Rev. Proc. 94-61,
I.R.B. 1994-38, 56.
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS.  The spouse of the
sole shareholder received payments as salary and was
allowed use of the automobile owned by the corporation.
The court held that the payments were not deductible as
wage payments where the corporation provided no proof of
services performed by the spouse for the corporation.  The
payments and automobile use were held to be constructive
dividends to the shareholder spouse.  Alexander Shokai,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,460 (9th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-41.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
October 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.00 5.91 5.87 5.84
110% AFR 6.61 6.50 6.45 6.41
120% AFR 7.22 7.09 7.03 6.99
Mid-term
AFR 7.10 6.98 6.92 6.88
110% AFR 7.83 7.68 7.61 7.56
120% AFR 8.56 8.38 8.29 8.24
Long-term
AFR 7.69 7.55 7.48 7.43
110% AFR 8.48 8.31 8.23 8.17
120% AFR 9.27 9.06 8.96 8.89
TRAVEL EXPENSES. A federal district court judge
was not allowed a deduction for travel and meal expenses
incurred while serving as judge and was required to include
in income amounts received in partial reimbursement for
those expenses. Putnam v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,466 (5th Cir. 1994), rev’g, 826 F. Supp. 988
(W.D. La. 1993).
LABOR
ALIEN AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 3.04.*
The plaintiff employed undocumented aliens to perform
agricultural labor. As a result of a short strike, the plaintiff
fired the aliens. The California ALRB held that the firing
violated the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act and
ordered the plaintiff to reinstate the aliens and pay for the
lost wages. The plaintiff argued that the aliens were
unavailable for work because they were illegally in the
country and could not work under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. The court held that the INA or its
regulations did not preempt the California policy of
including illegal aliens in coverage under the California
ALRA. The plaintiff also argued that it was a farm labor
contractor and under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Protection Act (MSAWPA) was prohibited from
hiring illegal aliens. The court held that the plaintiff was not
a farm labor contractor because the plaintiff was also an
agricultural employer. Phillip D. Bertelsen, Inc. v. ALRB,
29 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. App. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Baptiste v. Comm’r, 29 F.3d 1533 (8th Cir. 1994),
rev’g on point, 100 T.C. 252 (1993) (transferee liability for
estate tax) see p. 126 supra.
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtor operated a hog breeding,
raising and feeding operation in which the debtor raised
hogs belonging to investors and then sold the hogs for a
guaranteed price to be paid to the investors. The investors
obtained title to the hogs but the debtor retained possession;
however, the hogs were not tagged or otherwise separated
from other hogs on the premises to identify the hogs
belonging to a particular investor or even the hogs owned
by the debtor. The debtor had granted a security interest in
all livestock to a bank as security for operating credit. The
bankruptcy trustee sold all of the hogs on the premises
when the debtor filed for bankruptcy and one investor
sought a portion of the proceeds as owner of some of the
hogs sold. The court held that the bank’s security interest
had priority over the investor’s interest under three
alternative reasons: (1) the investor’s purchase of the hogs
sold by the trustee was not proved because the hogs were
not clearly identified; (2) the investor's hogs were left in the
possession of the debtor and the debtor had the power to
sell the hogs so the bank’s security interest attached to the
hogs; and (3) the investor failed to prove any purchase of
the hogs from the debtor. Matter of Joy, 169 B.R. 931
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1994).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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